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The  global  financial  crisis  proved  the  critical  impact  of  the  gap  between  individual 
rationality  and  group  rationality.  This  gap  is  not  supposed  to  arise  in  a  Neoclassical 
world, but it frequently arises in a world as complex as ours. The paper explores how 
endogenous instability might arise due to such a gap, and what behavioral rules might 
help to mitigate its impact. 
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1  Introduction 
In November, 2008, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis, Queen Elizabeth II of England was visiting London School of 
Economics. She asked the group of eminent economists attending: “Why nobody noticed 
that  the  credit  crunch  was  on  its  way?”  Later,  in  June,  2009,  the  British  Academy 
organized a forum to discuss the subject, and based on that, British Academy Fellows, 
Tim Besley and Peter Hennessy, prepared a letter to the Queen to provide the answer 
(Besley and Hennessy, 2009). Towards the end of the letter, the authors note: 
So  where  was  the  problem?  Everyone  seemed  to  be  doing  their  own  job 
properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of success, they 
were often doing it well. The failure was to see how collectively this added up 
to  a  series  of  interconnected  imbalances  over which  no  single  authority  had 
jurisdiction. This, combined with the psychology of herding and the mantra of 
financial  and  policy  gurus,  lead  to  a  dangerous  recipe.  Individual  risks  may 
rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was 
vast. (Emphasis added.) 
 The letter concludes: 
In summary, Your Majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity 
of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a 
failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country 
and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole. (Emphasis 
added). 
So one main reason behind the crisis was the well known “fallacy of composition:” to 
infer that what is true for an individual bank or institution is also true for the whole 
market or economy. The fallacy arises due to failure to understand “the fact that the way 
the parts relate, interact, or affect each other often changes the character of the whole” 
(Damer, 2009, p. 140). Early economics textbooks used to illustrate the fallacy, mainly 
through  the  paradox  of  thrift.  But  it  has  been  gradually  de-emphasized  in  later  texts 
(Lutz, 1999, p. 7). 4 
 
In Neoclassical theory, such fallacy is not supposed to arise, at least not seriously. 
The “invisible  hand”  is  supposed  to  coordinate self-interested  agents  and  produce  the 
good for the whole group. Self-interest is sufficient to satisfy group-interest. But we know 
that this is frequently not the case, the crisis being the most visible example. The fallacy 
has many applications in various economic activities, including growth, development, and 
trade  (e.g.  Mayer,  2003).  It  shows  that  the  representative  agent  model  cannot  be 
warranted  due  to  divergence  of  macro  phenomena  from  micro  behavior  (Caballero, 
1992). The fact that the whole in many ways differs from the parts is a major point of 
departure of Complexity Economics from Neoclassical theory (Al-Suwailem, 2010). 
Standard  macroeconomic  models  assume  that  the  source  of  variability  is 
exogenous;  endogenous  instability  is  assumed  out  (Buiter,  2009).  Prior  to  the  crisis, 
economic  models  assumed  “crash-free”  markets,  which  itself  contributed  to  the  crash 
(Bouchaud,  2008).  Not  only  did  these  models  fail to  provide  answers  to  questions of 
insolvency and illiquidity, they did not allow these questions to be asked in the first place 
(Buiter, 2009). 
The  crisis  proved  how  volatility  could  arise  endogenously  from  traders’  and 
bankers’ actions. Adrian Turner (2009), governor of Financial Services Authority, UK, 
remarks: 
… indeed, there are good reasons for believing that the financial industry, more 
than any other sector of the economy, has an ability to generate unnecessary 
demand for its own services—that more trading and more financial innovation 
can under some circumstances create harmful volatility against which customers 
have  to  hedge,  creating  more  demand  for  trading  liquidity  and  innovative 
products; that parts of the financial services industry have a unique ability to 
attract  to  themselves  unnecessarily  high  returns  and  create  instability  which 




This paper aims to examine how fallacy of composition in financial markets may 
lead to endogenous instability. Section 2 documents the endogenous volatility of financial 
markets.  Section  3  presents  game-theoretic  models  of  fallacy  of  composition,  and 
discusses some examples of fallacious behavior, particularly in the run up to the financial 
crisis.  Section  4  discusses  roots  of  fallacious  behavior  and  related  remedies.  The 
conclusion is presented in section 5. 
 
2  Endogenous Instability 
  It  has  been  long-observed  that  financial  markets  show  “excess  volatility”,  as 
demonstrated by Robert Shiller (1989) and others. Shiller finds that volatility of stock 
market (S&P 500) is much higher than would have been predicted by efIcient market 
hypothesis, particularly for the latest part of the twentieth century. 
  Campbell and Ammer (1993) find that, for postwar data, 55-70% of variance of 
excess stock returns is attributed to changes of expectations of future returns, and only 
15-20% is attributed to changes in expected future dividends. Nardari and Scruggs (2005) 
find  that  most  changes  (87%)  in  stock  market  volatility  over  time  are  explained  by 
variations in volatility of expected returns. These results show how excess volatility of 
financial markets arises largely from within the market, i.e endogenously. 
Anders Johansen and Didier Sornette (2006) examine crashes in financial markets, 
and  distinguish  between  crashes  resulting  from  endogenous  speculative  behavior  and 
those resulting from exogenous shocks like declaration of war. They find that endogenous 
crashes are preceded by super-exponential power law price appreciation, or what they call 
“log-periodic power law signature (LPPS),” which is consistent with rational speculative 
bubbles. By examining financial markets worldwide (stocks, currency, bonds) during the 
past  century,  49  crashes  are  identiIed,  25  of  which  are  found  to  be  endogenous,  22 
exogenous, and 2 are associated with the Japanese anti-bubble. 
According to Jean-Philippe Bouchaud (2010), news plays a minor role in financial 
market  volatility;  most  jumps  appear  to  be  unrelated  to  news,  but  seem  to  appear 
spontaneously as a result of the market activity itself. Further, the stylized facts of price 6 
 
statistics (fat-tails in the distribution of returns, long-memory of the volatility) are to a 
large extent universal, independent of the particular nature of the traded asset, and very 
reminiscent of endogenous noise in other complex systems (turbulence, earthquakes, etc.). 
In all these examples, the intermittent, avalanche nature of the dynamics is an emergent 
property, unrelated to the exogenous drive which is slow and regular. 
  Remarkably, the volatility of the real sector has been declining in the second half 
of  the  twentieth  century  (Kahn  et  al.,  2002;  Davis  and  Kahn,  2008).  Yet,  financial 
markets during the same period have shown no sign of reduced volatility (Brock, 2002). 
In fact,  the evidence  is  mounting  that  they  became  increasingly  volatile (World  Bank, 
2001; Bordo et al., 2001). According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, pp. 344-347), from 
1930 till 1969, there were around 31 banking crises worldwide. From 1970 till 2007, the 
number jumps to 167. “The fact that the total risk of the financial markets has grown in 
spite of a marked decline in exogenous economic risk to the country is a key symptom of 
the design flaws within the system” (Bookstaber, 2007, p. 5). 
  Figure  1  compares  volatility  of  the  growth  rate  of  GDP  of  the  US  to  that  of 
S&P500. Volatility is calculated as standard deviations for a 10-year window. The ratio 
of S&P500 volatility to that of GDP is plotted. It can be seen that, starting from early 
1980s, there was an upward trend in S&P500 volatility relative to that of  GDP. The 
average  ratio of  volatilities  for  1959-1980  is  5.8,  but  9.8  for  1980-2010.  As Table  1 
shows, while volatility of GDP has dropped by about 35% in 1981-2010, volatility of 
S&P500 for the same period has risen by about 21%. 
 
 








Volatility of GDP and S&P500 
  GDP  S&P500  Ratio 
1950q1-1980q4  1.3%  5.8%  4.5 
1981q1-2010q4  0.8%  7%  8.5 
Change, %  -35%  +21%  88% 








































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Ratio of Volatility of SP500 to Volatility of GDP
Standard deviation of growth rate of S&P500, divided by the standard deviation of growth of 
GDP.  S&P500  monthly  data  are  averaged  quarterly  to  match  the  frequency  of  GDP.  Both 
S&P500 and GDP levels are in current dollars and are indexed so that 1950q1 = 100. Standard 
deviation is computed for a 10-year (40 quarters) window. 
Source: finance.yahoo.com and www.bea.gov. 8 
 
3  Financial Fallacies 
There are two ways to model fallacy of composition: n-person zero-sum game, and n-
person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
3.1  n-Person Zero-sum Games 
  A zero-sum game is a game in which payoffs of players always add to zero. To win 
in a zero-sum game is not impossible for any individual player per se. But it is impossible 
for all players to win simultaneously.  
One  way  to  model  n-person  zero-sum  games  is  through  the  “minority  game.” 
Minority games (e.g. Challet et al., 2005) are games in which players have two choices. 
After choice is made, those who are in the minority win, while the majority loses. By 
design, there is no outcome that satisfies all players. Since it is in the interest of each 
player to win, each player wants to be in the minority, which is impossible to be achieved. 
To  be  in  the  minority  therefore  is  self-defeating,  and  thus  generates  fluctuations 
endogenously (Batten, 2006, 2007). Each player is trying to predict the choice of others. 
Outguessing creates self-referential loop that makes the game inherently unstable.  
(J.M.  Keynes’s  (1936)  “beauty  contest”  is  a  guessing  game,  but  it  is  not  an 
outguessing game. It is a majority game, not a minority game. That is, players need to 
guess the guesses of others, but need not prevent others from guessing theirs, and thus 
players’  guesses  might  possibly  converge.  Outguessing  however  cannot  converge  by 
construction.) 
  Foster  and  Young  (2001)  argue  that  there  is  an  inherent  tension  between 
rationality of players and their abilities to predict the behavior of their opponents when 
payoffs are uncertain. Specifically, there are games in which it is impossible for perfectly 
rational  players  to  learn  to  predict  the  future  behavior  of  their  opponents  (even 
approximately), no matter what learning rule they use. The reason is that in trying to 
predict the next-period behavior of an opponent, a rational player must take an action 
this period that the opponent can observe. This observation may cause the opponent to 
alter his next-period behavior, thus invalidating the first player’s prediction. The authors 
argue that there are strategic situations in which it is impossible in principle for perfectly 9 
 
rational agents to learn to predict the future behavior of other perfectly rational agents 
based solely on their observed actions (see also Nachbar, 2005). It should be noted that 
this  impossibility  result  holds  for  the  players  themselves.  For  outside  observers,  the 
authors note, it is possible to recognize certain patterns in players’ behavior. This reflects 
the divergence of individual agents from the system as a whole. So while individual agents 
are unable to predict the behavior of their opponents, it is possible for an outside observer 
to some extent to predict the behavior of the whole system. 
  The  impossibility  of  predicting  opponents’  behavior  by  competing  agents  was 
envisioned long before (see Koppl and Rosser, 2002). Herbert Simon (1978a, p. 9; 1978b, 
p. 360) considers the problem of “outguessing” in an imperfect-competition environment 
as “the permanent and ineradicable scandal of economic theory.” He points out that “the 
whole  concept  of  rationality  became  irremediably  ill-defined  when  the  possibility  of 
outguessing was introduced,” and that a different framework and methodology must be 
adopted to understand economic behavior in such conditions (cited in Rubinstein, 1998, 
p. 188). 
  The problem of “outguessing” is most acute in speculative markets. J.M. Keynes 
(1936, pp. 154-155) describes speculation as a “battle of wits,” and the objective is to 
“outwit the crowd”. Speculators are not concerned with valuing the long term yield of an 
investment, but rather with foreseeing changes in conventional valuation of the asset “a 
short time ahead of the general public.” Similarly, Warren Buffet (2000, p. 14) points out 
that speculation is not about predicting what an asset will produce, but rather about what 
other market players will do in order to be ahead of the them. Speculators “spent their 
time chasing one another’s tails,” as Krugman (2009a) remarks. So it is an outguessing, 
minority game. Each player is trying to decide to buy or to sell ahead of the majority. But 
if  everyone  is  trying  to  do  the  same,  it  is  impossible  to  reach  a  mutually  satisfying 
outcome. Speculative markets therefore become inherently unstable. 
  Lux  and  Marchesi  (1999)  model  Inancial  markets  as  consisting  of  “chartists,” 
those who seek to predict the behavior of other players, and of “fundamentalists,” those 
who seek to predict the value of the asset based on its fundamentals. The probability that 
a  given  trader  switches  from  one  group  to  the  other  evolves  endogenously  based  on 10 
 
profits made. The model shows that,  when  chartists  dominate  the market, it becomes 
highly volatile, but reverts to stability when the number of fundamentalists recovers back. 
Thus,  speculative  behavior  tends  to  be  destabilizing  and  endogenously  generates 
turbulence.  
  Markose  at  al.  (2004)  model  a  financial  market  as  a  network  of  agents.  The 
network evolves endogenously by agents changing the weights of their links to neighbors 
based on performance. When returns are generated endogenously through minority game 
structure, the network becomes highly clustered with fat tails and thus higher likelihood 
of extreme events.  
Ponzi Schemes 
  One  obvious  example  of  n-person  zero  sum  games  is  Ponzi  schemes.  A  Ponzi 
scheme is a system in which a participant pays a fee to A in order to be able to collect 
more fees from B and C, and each of these two repeats the process creating an ever-
growing pyramid. Because Ponzi schemes  are illegal in many countries, proponents of 
such schemes invented “pyramid schemes” or “multi-layer marketing schemes.” These are 
Ponzi  schemes  but  the  fee  now  is  presented  as  a  price  for  a  certain  product  or 
merchandise. The scheme promises participants high returns based primarily on recruiting 
others to join the program, not based on profits from selling the product to consumers. 
The product is not sold to consumers, but rather sold to other recruiters, who in turn sell 
to  yet  more  recruiters,  ad  infinitum.  Regulators  still  take  strong  stance  against  such 
schemes (Valentine, 1998). It should be noted that while a pyramid scheme is a multi-
person zero-sum game, new participants (those  at the bottom of  the  pyramid)  do not 
consider themselves losers. Individually, each hopes or expects to make profits in the near 
future, but this is impossible for all participants. 
  Ponzi  and  pyramid  schemes illustrate  the  characteristic  fragility of  finance,  and 
may arise in various environments including banking and financial bubbles (World Bank, 
2001, pp. 10, 79, 145). 11 
 
  Bubbles 
It is not  difficult to see that a speculative  bubble is a kind of a  Ponzi scheme: 
investors win only if there are enough newcomers to buy and keep prices up, and those in 
turn  win only  if  more  investors join,  and so  on.  Unless  there  is an  infinite stream of 
capital  flowing  into  the  market,  it  is  impossible  for  all  investors  to  win.  Holding  the 
intrinsic value of traded assets constant, a speculative bubble is a multi-person zero-sum 
game. Since such bubbles are usually not deliberately organized by specific persons, Shiller 
(2000,  ch.  3)  calls  them  “naturally  occurring  Ponzi  processes.”  For  each  individual 
investor, it is profitable to join the rising market with the expectation that the “greater 
fool” or the “sucker” will absorb the losses. But as each investor behaves in this manner, 
the divergence between asset price and the fundamentals widens, and thus the likelihood 
and magnitude of a crash rises substantially. The initial driver of market rise could be a 
general  belief  that  assets  are  undervalued,  introduction  of  new  technologies  or 
innovations  that  could  open  new  opportunities,  deregulation,  easy  credit  and  excess 
money supply, etc. (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). But once the market starts rising, it 
might  transform  into  a  Ponzi  process  and  generate  self-fulfilling,  but  unsustainable, 
expectations. 
The  mechanism  of  bubble  formation  can  be  further  clarified  using  the  “Dollar 
Auction game.” The game, introduced by Shubik (1971), works as follows: A dollar bill is 
auctioned off, such that the highest bidder wins the dollar, but the second-highest bidder 
pays his bid to the auctioneer for nothing. Essentially, it is a zero-sum game including the 
two bidders and the auctioneer. In experiments, a dollar bill is eventually sold for more 
than one dollar in most cases (Colman, 1999, pp. 196-199). This seems quite strange, but 
the explanation lies in the rule that the second-highest bidder stands to lose. Since neither 
bidder wants to be the second-highest bidder, he keeps bidding. Before bidding reaches 
$1, there is a chance for the winner to make a profit. Afterwards, each bidder is trying to 
minimize losses. At each bidding round, each player considers raising the bid a little more 
will  not  cause  much  additional  loss.  However,  as  the  bidding  war  escalates,  losses 
accumulate and bidding value goes way beyond the value of the auctioned dollar. 12 
 
The game models the problem of self-reinforcing escalation. It provides insights on 
how in reality investors might keep throwing “good money after bad.” But it is not only 
the problem of “sunk costs” that causes the escalation. More important, it is the zero-sum 
structure of payoffs that breeds the competition and the psychology of conflict. In a zero-
sum game, “players are forever at each other’s throat” (Gardner, 1995, p. 37). As detailed 
experiments show, the Dollar Auction game starts with incentives to make profits, and 
then develops into a conflict in which each bidder wants to “prove himself” and refuses to 
give up (Colman, 1999, pp. 197-198).  
When  trading in  financial  markets becomes  mostly speculative,  zero-sum  game, 
there is a good chance that it transforms into a kind of Dollar Auction game. For each 
financial asset, there are many side-bets; each involves a winner and a loser. Each bet can 
be  viewed  as  a  Dollar  Auction  game,  with  brokers  playing  partly  the  role  of  the 
auctioneer. No trader wants to be a loser, so they keep betting greater amounts, leading 
to higher values of the bet. This reflects back on the value of the underlying asset, leading 
to a second round of betting, and so on. Each wants to avoid the losses and thus wants to 
shift the “hot potato” to the other, and by doing so, the market keeps rising to unrealistic 
levels.  The  game  harbors  its  own  self-escalating  mechanism,  leading  to  bubbles  and, 
subsequently, crashes. 
This  is  confirmed  by  what  Brunnermeier  and  Pedersen  (2005)  call  “predatory 
trading”:  trading  that  exploits  the  need  of  other  investors.  If  an  investor  needs  to 
liquidate, other traders sell to push the price of the asset downward, and then they buy 
back  to  profit  from  the  swing.  This  leads  to  price  overshooting,  thus  endogenously 
generating fluctuations. Further, a trader profits from another trader’s crisis, and the crisis 
can spell over across traders and across markets.  
Shadow Banking 
Historically,  commercial  banks  have  frequently  suffered  runs  on  their  demand 
deposits. The reason is the fractional reserve structure whereby depositors are guaranteed 
the nominal value of their deposits on demand, while in reality only a fraction of these 
deposits  is  available  for  withdrawal.  Fragility  of  banks  led  to  creation  of  a  whole 13 
 
spectrum  of  institutions,  including  central  banks  and  deposit  insurance,  together  with 
tight regulations of commercial banks, to minimize bank runs.  
With the growth of financial and money markets, financial institutions (including 
commercial banks) were able to find alternative sources of funding: short-term borrowing 
through short-term papers. By borrowing short-term  and lending long-term,  non-bank 
financial  institutions  were  able  to  replicate  the  banking  model,  as  short-term  and 
overnight loans (repos) replace deposits. However, there is no safety net and regulatory 
structure to protect such “shadow banks” from classical, century old, bank-type runs. 
The sizable growth of shadow banking made the financial system greatly vulnerable and 
fragile. In 2007, size of the shadow system was $10.5 trillion, while that of commercial 
banks was $10 trillion (Geithner, 2008). By the end of 2006, investment banks in the US 
were rolling more than 25% of their liabilities on daily basis (Baily et al., 2008). The 
financial crisis thus was precipitated by a classical run (Brunnermeier, 2009; Krugman, 
2009b, ch. 8). 
Borrowing short and lending long create a fallacious structure. It is possible for 
some depositors to withdraw (or for some overnight lenders to stop rolling over), without 
affecting the solvency of the bank. But many depositors or lenders cannot do the same 
without the bank collapsing. Those who are able to withdraw do so only at the expense 
of others being less likely able to withdraw. As long as remaining depositors or lenders do 
not  withdraw,  the  problem  is  not  visible.  But the moment  their  confidence is slightly 
shaken, a run is enacted. As Chuck Prince, then CEO of Citigroup, remarked in summer 
of 2007: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as 
long  as  the  music  is  playing,  you’ve  got  to  get  up  and  dance.  We’re  still  dancing” 
(Financial Times, 10.07.2007). So, as long as house prices were rising, lenders were happy 
to roll over trillions of short-term debt used to Inance 20 or 30 years mortgages. But 
when prices started to flatter, creditors rushed out of the doors, leading to “the mother of 
all bank runs” (Roubini and Mihm, 2010, p. 80). 
Although  maturity  mismatching  creates  liquidity  at  the  micro  level  (i.e.  for  an 
individual lender or depositor), at the macro level it creates systemic risks. A run on a 
given bank will not be limited to that bank. Because banks are inter-connected, other 14 
 
banks  may  also  suffer  runs  on  their  deposits,  creating  a  contagion  that  threatens  the 
system as a whole. The same is true for shadow banks, with greater risks arising from the 
sensitivity of financial markets. 
Banks use short-term debt because it has lower costs than medium or long-term 
loans. Lenders who are able to get their money ahead of other creditors face fewer risks; 
hence, they charge lower premiums. As long as money markets are functioning normally 
and thus very unlikely to dry up suddenly, this seems like a good opportunity for banks to 
make additional profits. Other banks naturally would follow the same strategy. However, 
medium or longer-term creditors of these banks will be at a disadvantage if any bank 
faces any kind of difficulty. These creditors therefore might start to switch to a shorter 
time  horizon.  Gradually,  more  and  more  creditors  insist  on  shorter  and  shorter  time 
horizons for repayment. The result is that a majority of banks and creditors are rolling 
trillions of debt on daily or weekly basis. The market becomes extremely fragile, and a 
few creditors who refuse to roll over can trigger a massive run. This analysis is consistent 
with the trend in Asset-backed Commercial Papers (ABCP), whereby the rising size and 
shrinking maturity increased rapidly in the run up to the crisis (Baily et al., 2008, p. 30; 
Rajan,  2010,  p.  151).  Thus,  what  starts  as  a  remote  possibility  develops  through  the 
fallacy of composition into a highly probable event.  
  Complex Derivatives 
  Life would have been much different if it were risk-free. Unfortunately, uncertainty 
is deeply ingrained in our universe even at the most elementary level (as indicated by 
Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle”). Thus there is no way to entirely eliminate risk from 
economic activities. While some may be able to avoid risk for some time by shifting it to 
others, if everyone decided to do the same, the economy simply would collapse. It is a 
perfect example of a fallacy of composition. It might be insightful however to see what 
would happen before reaching that end. 
Suppose that, while the majority of agents want to avoid risk, a few are willing to 
take  them.  Then  risks  that  were  scattered  and  diversified  become  concentrated  and 
correlated.  Those  risk  takers  become  “systemically  important,”  since  a  failure  of  one 15 
 
might bring down the whole economy. What might appear for an individual agent as 
reduction of risk, ends up making the whole economy more risky. 
During the subprime  bubble before the recent crisis, banks felt more secure  by 
shifting the risks of their mortgage borrowers, through structured finance like CDOs and 
CDS, to risk takers like AIG, Lehman Brothers, and others. This encouraged banks to 
extend lending further to riskier borrowers, feeding the housing bubble. Further, banks 
were able to shift standard risks that can be easily  assessed. Non-standard risks were 
retained.  Thus,  banks  replaced  simple  and  “vanilla”  risks  with  more  complicated and 
more  paying  risks (Rajan,  2005,  p.  317).  This means  that  risk transfer did not make 
banks  less  risky;  in  fact,  they  became  more  risky.  But  because  of  the  way  structured 
finance worked, these two types of risk, transferred and retained, were ultimately linked. 
With the accumulation and build up of huge risks by banks and AIG, both became more 
risky. According to FSA (2009, p. 16), most of securitized credit ended up not with end 
investors, but rather with banks. Through structured finance and complex derivatives, 
most of risk was left on banks’ balance sheets. 
Risk takers like AIG were happy with the upfront fees that they were getting and 
the resulting bounces in the short run. But as these institutions were building up risks, 
banks became in fact less secure than they perceived. The more debts AIG and Lehman 
were “insuring,” the  more risk was being built  up,  the more  the housing  bubble was 
inflating,  and  thus  the  more  the  system  became  fragile  and  interconnected.  A  slight 
slowdown  of  house  prices  therefore  caused  waves  of  defaults  and  subsequent  market 
meltdown. 
Informational Asymmetry 
Risk-shifting  yields  additional  forms  of  fallacy  of  composition.  Derivatives,  the 
common means for shifting risks, are zero-sum contracts (Greenspan, 1999). Since the 
objective is to shift risk, but not the ownership of the underlying asset, the contract ends 
up with a gain to one party and a loss to the other. In theory, derivatives are supposed to 
shift risk to those who are more able to bear it, thus making the two parties, ex ante (in 
contrast to their ex post zero-sum nature), better off. In reality, though, risk is shifted to 16 
 
those who are more willing to bear the risk. Due to asymmetric information, those who 
are more willing to take risks are frequently those who are less able to bear them. Because 
derivatives  are  zero-sum  contracts  by  nature,  there  will  be  a  feedback  from  payoff 
structure to informational asymmetry: Since players are in direct conflict, they have every 
incentive to hide information and misrepresent their choices, to the extent of adopting 
randomized strategies (Schelling, 1960). Informational asymmetry, therefore, is likely to 
rise, leading to greater distortions of the distribution of risk being born by the less able 
but  more  willing.  This  further  intensifies  conflict  of  interest,  worsening  informational 
asymmetry, deteriorating risk distribution, and so on. 
Arora  et  al.  (2010)  argue  that  financial  derivatives  (like  CDOs  and  CDS)  can 
worsen informational asymmetry and amplify the associated costs. The reason is that, due 
to computational complexity, the seller is able to rely on computational intractability to 
disguise their information via “cherry picking.” Using input information that is available 
to all parties, the derivative can be structured in a manner that cannot be understood or 
priced with any foreseeable amount of computational effort, and this is true even for very 
simple models of asset yields. The incentive for this “cryptography” is not difficult to see: 
the inherent conflict of interest in zero-sum games. This explains how financial derivatives 
became increasingly complex, and thus more risky, particularly in the run up to the crisis. 
Informational asymmetry also leads to higher risks taken by banks, as pointed out 
earlier  (Rajan,  2005).  Banks  are  able  to  transfer  plain  vanilla  risks for  which enough 
symmetric  information  is  available  to  risk  takers.  More  complicated  risks,  with  less 
symmetric information, are kept on the books of banks. As banks expand their business 
and take more risks, the distribution of risk on their books deteriorates. The result is that 
banks become more, not less, risky. 
3.2  n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
  Multi-person Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a model of “social dilemmas,” in 
which  individual  rationality  leads  to  collective  irrationality  (Rapoport,  1987;  Colman, 
1999, pp. 201-223; Kollock, 1998). It is a classical example of the fallacy of composition: 
if each agent acts selfishly hoping to be ahead of others, they all end up in the worst 17 
 
possible  position. Interestingly,  according to  Peter  Nonacs  (2011),  Prisoner’s  Dilemma 
arises only in human society. “There is simply no conclusive evidence that a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma applies anywhere in nature apart from human interactions” (p. 423).  
  Prisoner’s Dilemma game may endogenously generate instability. Nowak and May 
(1992) examine a simple PD game played on 2-dimension spatial arrays. In each round, 
every  individual  ‘plays  the  game’  with  immediate  neighbors;  after  this,  each  site  is 
occupied either by its original owner or by one of the neighbors, depending on who scores 
the highest total in that round. Despite its simplicity (no strategies and no memories), the 
game  can  generate  chaotically  changing  spatial  patterns,  in  which  cooperators  and 
defectors both persist indefinitely (in fluctuating proportions about predictable long-term 
averages). 
  Nowak and Sigmund (1993) examine iterated PD with heterogeneous population 
of simple strategies, whose behavior is totally specified by the outcome of the previous 
round.  They  show  that  the  game  can  lead  to  persistent  periodic  or  highly  irregular, 
chaotic oscillations in the frequencies of the strategies and the overall level of cooperation. 
  The reason behind endogenous instability in PD game is simple: Defection doesn’t 
pay unless there are (enough) cooperators. To defect amongst defectors doesn’t pay. The 
relation  between  defectors  and  cooperators  is  to  some  extent  similar  to  that  between 
predators and preys. Too many predators will make them lose and vanish. Too many 
cooperators invite predators to multiply.  
  The PD framework can explain many aspects of financial behaviors and its relation 
to economic phenomena.  
PD and Financial Fallacies 
  There are many ways in which financial instability arises endogenously through 
PD-like interactions. One aspect is the choice of debt versus equity in financing economic 
activities. In a non-cooperative setting (i.e. without binding agreements), the choice of 
debt vs. equity between a banker and a business owner, can be modeled as a PD game: 
Equity, the cooperative choice, is Pareto-optimal; yet, each has the opportunity to take 
advantage of the other. The business owner can misreport profits in case of success, while 18 
 
the banker can blame the owner in case of failure, and thus refuses to bear the losses. 
With mutual distrust, the two ends up in choosing debt over equity, although they are 
both better off choosing equity (Al-Suwailem, 2005). 
  The  trend  in  increasing  leverage  in  many  economies  can,  at  least  in  part,  be 
explained through n-person PD framework. On the aggregate level, everyone is better off 
in  an  economy  with  high  level  of  equity  and  low  level  of  debt.  If  most  banks  and 
corporations follow this conservative strategy, the company that deviates and increases its 
leverage will enjoy higher returns on equity (ROE) and thus higher share value and larger 
bonuses. Others will be in a disadvantaged position, and thus follow en suite. The result is 
a  “leverage  race,”  with  ever-increasing  fragility  and,  eventually,  instability.  Although 
collectively, they are better off with lower leverage, individualistic evaluation makes every 
on worse off. 
 
    Majority 
    High equity  High leverage 
Minority 
High equity  a  c 
High leverage  b  d 
    Minority Payoff:  b > a > d > c 
 
The table above represents an n-person PD game. Firms have two choices: high equity and 
low  leverage  (the  cooperative  choice),  or  low  equity  and  high  leverage  (competitive 
choice). The game is played between the “majority” and the “minority”. Numbers in cells 
are the payoffs of the minority. If the majority of firms choose to have high equity, it pays 
to the minority to choose high leverage because this will make them more profitable while 
the system is still stable since the majority has low leverage. But if everyone chooses high 
leverage, the system becomes highly fragile and all are exposed to higher risks.  19 
 
This  might  explain  the  “thrust  towards  fragility”  that  Hyman  Minsky 
characterized  of  capitalist  economies,  as  part  of  his  “financial  instability  hypothesis” 
(Minsky, 1982, 1986). 
  A  similar  race,  but  in  the  opposite  direction,  happens  when  deleveraging  in 
economic downturns. As market demand slows down, creditors demand higher collateral 
and/or  force  foreclosure  of  assets  or  properties,  as  happened  in  the  recent  crisis.  The 
negative impact of foreclosure of properties extends beyond direct borrowers and lenders, 
increasing the downward pressure of prices, leading to another wave of defaults due to 
inability to refinance. The downward spiral can be avoided if creditors give respite to 
borrowers  and  allow  forbearance;  in  this  case  every  one  is  better  off  as  assets  and 
properties preserve their values with minimum collateral damage. But if most creditors 
follow this strategy, some would be better off to deviate and force foreclosure, because 
they will be able to auction off the property at reasonable prices. It is the same n-PD 
problem.  
  The race for leverage and deleverage is even worse in financial markets. Thurner et 
al. (2010) analyze collateralized short-term debt with margin calls, widely practiced in 
financial markets. In this environment, funds that use higher leverage are able to generate 
higher profits, and thus attract more investors. As other investment funds follow, average 
leverage  increases.  Thurner  et  al.  also  show  how  such  leverage  causes  endogenous 
volatility.  Without  leverage,  investors’  strategy  is  stabilizing:  to  buy  in  falling  market 
where  price  is  below  fundamental  value,  and  sell  when  market  is  booming.  But  with 
leverage, a price drop causes margin calls, which makes investment funds sell assets that 
they  would  otherwise  be  buying.  When  many  funds  sell,  price  drops  further,  causing 
another round of feedback. The authors show how such nonlinear dynamics lead to fat 
tails and clustered volatility. This supports the argument that market volatility is caused 
by endogenous dynamics rather than the nature of exogenous information. 
Speculative Pressure 
  The trend in increasing speculative activities can also be explained, again at least in 
part, using the PD framework.  20 
 
Consider a real trade transaction, in which a supplier has to deliver a certain good 
or  commodity  to  the  client,  and  the  latter  has  to  pay  the  full  price.  This  mutually 
beneficial transaction is essential for productive economies. Now consider an agreement 
between two parties to trade the same good or commodity at a future date, but instead of 
delivering  the  commodity,  the  two  parties  simply  settle  the  deal  through  paying  the 
change in price at maturity compared with the agreed price. If market price at maturity is 
higher, the seller pays the difference; if lower, the buyer pays the difference. This is simply 
a forward derivative contract. 
  Obviously, this contract is a bet against the good’s price. It is much less costly than 
the real trade transaction: No delivery and no full price payment. All they have to pay is 
price difference at maturity (plus a small down payment at contract time). Thus, other 
things constant, the winner in the bet is able to make more money than in case of the real 
trade transaction. The loser, however, does not necessarily consider himself a net loser: 
He reverses the bet with other parties, so the loss is born by another bettor, who in turn 
also reverses the bet, etc. Speculators are playing an n-person zero-sum game in which 
loss is pushed to the “greater fool,” as discussed earlier. From speculators’ point of view, 
they expect to make more money than those in the real sector, and in fact, in the short 
run, they might very well be doing so. Just like a bubble, however, it must come to a halt 
whereby the “greater fools” are unable to offload the risks, and the bubble explodes in 
their  hands.  Unfortunately,  at  that  stage,  losses  are  so  huge  that  even  the  real  sector 
suffers.  
Thus, overall, speculators perceive that they will make more money in good times, 
and, in bad times, will suffer comparable losses with the real sector. There is an incentive, 
therefore, to switch from real trade to betting, just like there is an incentive to defect in a 
PD  game.  This  incentive  though  holds  as  long  as  the  real  sector  is  doing  its  job. 
Otherwise,  if  most  economic  agents  decide  to  bet  rather  than  trade  and  produce  real 




    Majority 
    Trade  Bet 
Minority 
Trade  a  c 
Bet  b  d 
    Minority Payoff:  b > a > d > c 
 
Accordingly,  the relationship  between  the  speculative  sector  and the real  sector 
becomes  an  n-PD  relationship:  As  long  as  the  real  sector  is  producing,  it  pays  for 
speculators to bet; but if everyone becomes a bettor, they all lose. This is represented in 
the table above. 
But  the  problem  does  not  stop  here.  As  the  speculative  industry  grows  and 
expands, bettors keep looking for new ways to earn extra returns. The most natural way 
is to extend the previous trend: Instead of betting on real goods or commodities, why not 
bet on bets? The second level of betting has similar incentives of the first level: lower costs 
and easier means to make money. The first level of betting is “covered” betting, when the 
seller owns the underlying commodity. The second level is “naked” betting: the seller does 
not own the commodity; it becomes a purely side-bet. At another level, speculators bet on 
an “index” of commodities that simply does not physically exist. At even a higher level, 
speculators bet on an index of bets, and so on. In derivatives markets, there are futures on 
futures, futures on options, options on futures, etc. In the recent crisis, mortgage debt was 
securitized  through  several  levels:  it  starts  with  MBS,  then  CDO,  and  then  synthetic 
CDOs, CDO squared, CDO cubed, etc. 
Financial Decoupling 
  Financial fallacies cause financial markets to grow on their own. This results in 
disconnection of the financial sector from the real sector, where financial markets “seem 
to  develop  a  life  of  their  own,  and  at  times  appear  entirely  disconnected  from  their 
underlying  economic  fundamentals”  (Lux,  2009,  p.  218).  Unfortunately,  this 22 
 
disconnection is unsustainable, and correction has to take place, sooner or later. The cost 
of this divergence ultimately is paid by ordinary citizens in the real sector.  
 
3.3  Lucas Critique, Tail Risk and Black Swans 
In  n-person  zero-sum  games  and  n-Prisoner’s  Dilemma  games,  the  fallacy  of 
composition transforms an unlikely event into a reality. What starts as a “tail risk,” a 
low-probability event of loss or default, becomes by the actions of agents, a highly likely 
event.  
When agents behave and interact in a certain manner, it becomes a relatively stable 
regularity. The probability that this regularity fails becomes small or distant. Taking this 
regularity as given, an opportunity arises for some agents to take advantage of it. But as 
soon  as  others  start  to  realize  this  opportunity,  this  “regularity”  loses  stability,  and 
probability that it fails becomes very high.  
This is consistent with the “Lucas Critique”. A model may not be stable if it is 
used to recommend actions or behaviors that are not accounted for in the model itself (see 
Savin and Whitman, 1992). According to U. Rajan et al. (2010), models used to predict 
risk and probability of defaults are subject to Lucas critique: As agents (banks and others) 
know the models used for prediction, they will adapt their behavior accordingly. This 
makes  banks  take  additional  risks  assuming  that  probability  of  defaults  overall  are 
constant  as determined  by  these  models.  U.  Rajan  et al. (2010)  describe  the  result  as 
“Failure  of  Models  that  Predict  Failures”.  As  Stiglitz  (2010,  p.  95)  rightly  point  out, 
models  based  on  data  from  pre-securitization  era  were  used  to  create  financial 
instruments, like CDOs and CDSs, that alter the data-generating processes, which makes 
these models invalid. The models assumed “crash-free” markets, which itself contributed 
to the crash, as Bouchaud (2008) points out. 
But the Lucas Critique does not necessarily imply that, by utilizing such models, 
the tail risk becomes materialized. The latter is likely to happen only when agents are in 
conflict; in this case that utilizing the model to take advantage of other agents would lead 
them to react in the opposite direction, just as in a minority game or n-PD game. It is not 23 
 
difficult to see that that this result is consistent with the impossibility result of predicting 
the behavior of rational opponents, established by Foster and Young (2001) and Nachbar 
(2005), among others. 
This was the case with traders and bankers who were trying to maximize their 
returns by exploiting regularities detected by their models. As R. Rajan (2010, p. 146) 
points out, “their own collective actions precipitated the events they should have feared”. 
Mainelli and Giffords (2009, pp. 18-19) note that herd behavior combined with unending 
search  for  “alpha”  (or  excess  returns)  will  eventually  undermine  any  risk-mitigation 
structure, and create discontinuities and inevitable tail risks. So what was considered a 
“black swan” has been transformed into a “white swan” (Roubini and Mihm, 2010, p. 
300). 
 
4  Roots of Fallacious Behavior 
Raghuram  Rajan,  University  of  Chicago  professor  of  finance  and  former  chief 
economist at IMF, writes in his book, Fault Lines (2010, p. 126): 
In sum, bankers are not the horned, greedy villains the public now sees 
them to be. In the classes I have taught over the years, the future bankers 
were as eager, friendly, and ready to share as the other students in class … 
I  have  no  doubt  they  continue  to  be  decent,  caring  human  beings.  But 
because their business typically offers few pillars to which they can anchor 
their  morality,  their  primary  compass  becomes  how  much  money  they 
make. The picture of bankers slavering after bonuses soon after they had 
been rescued by government bailouts was not only outrageous but also 
pitiable—pitiable because they were clamoring for their primary measure 
of self-worth and status to be restored. (Emphasis added.) 
 
John Bogle, former CEO of Vanguard Group, in his book Enough (2010, p. xxiv) 
describes the  financial crisis as  an  “ethical  crisis”.  He  cites  Reuter’s  economics  editor 
Edward Hadas (2008) saying:  24 
 
A distressingly large portion of activity in the financial world is little more than 
gambling. When shares and bonds, or derivatives based on them, are bought 
and sold, the gains and losses almost cancel each other out. Such trading may 
be  fun  —  portfolio  management  is  a  common  hobby  —  but  it  does  almost 
nothing for the nonfinancial economy … There is a psychological, even a moral, 
problem with finance. A country gets rich by making stuff, not by seeming to 
make money from money … The economically illusory gains of finance distract 
people from more valuable tasks. 
 
Economics, from Adam Smith until J.M. Keynes, was understood to be a moral science 
(Staveren and Peil, 2011). Yet, virtually alone among the major professions, economics 
lacks a body of professional ethics to guide its practitioners (DeMartino, 2011). In the 
classification system of economic literature by American Economic Association, there is 
no entry for “ethics” or “morality”, although it mentions “social values”. The stories 
reported by industry experts, years before the crisis, show consequences of the steady 
decline of ethical and moral principles (Partnoy, 1997, 2003; Das, 2006; Ferguson and 
Marrs, 2010). 
As R. Rajan rightly notes, bankers and traders are not intrinsically villains; it is the 
nature of the environment they operate in and the game they keep playing. As we have 
seen in the Dollar Auction game, good, ordinary people suddenly may behave aggressively 
and violently due to the rules  of  the game.  If  we  want  people to  preserve their  good 
nature,  then  we  need  to  modify  the  rules  of  the  game.  In  particular,  fallacies  of 
composition  need  to be circumvented  in  order  to  dampen  the  incentive for  exploiting 
others and taking advantage of them. To reach that, not only regulatory measures are 
needed, but also, and as a prerequisite, ethical pillars need to be in place to which bankers 
and market players would anchor their morality. Below we discuss some essential aspects 
of ethics, and how they, by nature, could contain and circumvent financial fallacies. 
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4.1  Universalizability  
  Universalizability is a basic property of ethical statements. It means that “whatever 
is right (or wrong) in one situation, then it is right (or wrong) in any relevantly similar 
situation” (Singer, 1999; Harris et al., 2008, pp. 57, 64). This principle is common to 
moral theories of Kant (1785), Rawls (1971), and other moral philosophers (Barry, 1989, 
pp.  196-197).  According  to  Richard  Hare  (1977),  universalizability  is  common  to  all 
judgments, not only normative. Hence, offense against universalizability is logical, not 
(only) moral (Singer, 1999). 
  It is not difficult to see the moral appeal of this principle. It rests on the basic 
premise that humans are essentially equal: One cannot give himself privileges that others, 
sharing similar attributes and in comparable situations, shall not have. It reflects fairness 
and justice in treating self and others. Obviously, this principle does not allow for fallacies 
of composition to arise. In case of zeros-sum games, each player will do its best not to 
allow others to win, because if they do, he or she must lose. In a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game, the defector never wants others to defect. The dilemma therefore can be avoided if 
players adopt universalizable rules of behavior.  
Amartya Sen (1974) argues that the “categorical imperative” would eliminate the 
dilemma in PD  game, since defection is not universalizable. So does Anatol Rapoport 
(1987, pp. 975-976),  who points out that Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and  public  good 
games in general, “provide a rigorous rationale for Kant’s Categorical Imperative: act in 
the way you wish others to act. Acting on this principle reflects more than altruism. It 
reflects  a  form  of  rationality  which  takes  into  account  the  circumstance  that  the 
effectiveness of a strategy may depend crucially on how many others adopt it”. It is not 
difficult to see how deviation in a PD is logically inconsistent: The reason to deviate is to 
gain, not to lose. But if deviation is universalized, all players stand to lose. This defeats 
the primary reason for deviation. Deviation in PD therefore is self-defeating, as previously 
pointed out (see White, 2009, for a counter argument). 
This  kind  of  “rationality”  that  Rapoport  refers  to  is  close  to  “ecological 
rationality” advanced by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and Vernon Smith (2008). According to 26 
 
Smith,  a  behavior  is  ecologically  rational  if  it  is  adapted  to  the  structure  of  its 
environment (p. 36). He cites Hayek (1973) that this concept of rationality leads to the 
insight that orderliness of society preserved practices that enabled the group to prevail (p. 
37). Ecological rationality therefore extends individual rationality to group rationality. 
According to Nowak (2011, ch. 4), evolutionary models show how cooperation at 
the  group  level  allows  the  group  to  survive  and  surpass  groups  which  give  individual 
rationality  a  priority  over  group  rationality.  Groups  of  cooperators  tend  to  win  and 
triumph over groups of defectors.  
Coleman  et  al.  (2008)  provide  experimental  evidence  that  humans  favor  group 
rationality over individual rationality, despite that the latter is the Nash equilibrium of the 
game.  Most  subjects  expected  their  partners  to  cooperate  and  thus  follow  the  same 
collective choice approach. Coleman et al. argue that “team reasoning” is not equivalent 
to a weighted average of self and the other player. Rather, it is to maximize the collective 
payoff, even though the outcome is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. 
Overall, “ecological rationality,” “collective rationality,” or “team reasoning,” is 
consistent with human behavior. “Universalizability”, therefore, gains support not only 
from  fairness  and  justice,  but  also  from  evolutionary  dynamics  and  experimental 
evidence. 
4.2  Reversibility 
“Reversibility” is a local ethical property: It says that, in a bilateral interaction, 
one should choose an action that would be acceptable to him if he were in the other’s 
shoes. If each party follows the same rule, the set of actions they converge unto would be 
morally acceptable. The reason is that, in this manner, each treats the other equally to 
himself. Thus, “equilibrium” actions are fair to each other. When more than two parties 
are involved, reversibility pair wise may allow the group to reach mutually satisfying set 
of actions. The “reversible solution” could be reached as right from anyone’s perspective, 
given that each puts himself in the shoes of the other (Kohlberg, 1973).  
From  economics  point  of  view,  this  sounds  much  like  solving  simultaneous 
equations. Role-taking can be thought of as substituting choice function of each party 27 
 
into that of others. The “reversible solution” is equivalent to the solution of the equations 
or the “fixed point” of the system.  
Reversibility can be extended from a (small) group of agents to larger groups by 
repeatedly  applying  the  same  rule.  The  “reversible  solution”  therefore  becomes 
universalizable.  Hence,  local  reversibility  may  lead  to  global  universalizability  (see 
Wattles,  1996,  pp.  124-125).  This  resonates  well  with  complexity  approach  whereby 
global order is reached through local interactions. Reversibility therefore can be viewed as 
a decision process towards reaching universalizability. Further, the reversibility process 
itself is universalizable.  
A  zero-sum  game  cannot  be  admissible  by  the  reversibility  criterion:  Given  the 
outcome of the game (i.e. ex post), the winner would not hold to his choice if he puts 
himself in the loser’s shoes. Conflict of interests does not allow the two parties to reach 
mutually  satisfying  decisions.  Similarly,  in  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game,  the  defector 
strictly prefers the other player to cooperate; if he puts himself in the cooperator’s shoes, 
defection will not be admissible. Reversibility might find empirical support in the growing 
research in neuroscience of empathy. 
4.3  Empathy 
Role-taking  is  supported  by  recent  neuroscience  research  on  empathy.  There  is 
mounting evidence that observing a person performing a certain action activates a set of 
neurons in the observer’s brain that includes the same neurons responsible for performing 
that action by the observer himself. “Mirror neurons” work more or less as mirrors: to 
project the observed person’s activity onto the observer’s own mind, as if he is performing 
the action. This is true not only for actions, but also emotions (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 
2008). In this manner, one is able to temporary put himself in the other’s shoes. Research 
further  shows  that  such  process  takes  place  non-consciously.  Feelings  and  emotions 
resonate  spontaneously,  although  it  might  be  complemented  by  cognitive  inference. 
“Emotional resonance” helps coordinate behavior and harmonize actions. Since it is to a 
substantial  degree  spontaneous,  empathy  is  the  default  state  of  nature  (Baaren  et  al., 
2009; Pfeifer and Dapretto, 2009). 28 
 
Donald Pfaff (2007) argues that it is more costly for the neural system to isolate 
the  feelings  of  the  self  from  the  interacting  party  than  to  resonate  with  him.  The 
temporary blur of the barrier between identities induces empathy and shared feelings. It is 
not  difficult  to  see  how  shared  feelings  induces  “collective  rationality”  or  “team 
reasoning” that is at odds with the fallacy of composition.  
Pfaff  also  argues  that  our  brains  are  equipped  will  all  mechanisms  needed  for 
cooperative tendencies. Noam Chomsky proposed that humans are born with inherent 
capacity  to  learn  language.  Similarly,  Pfaff  argues,  humans  are  born  with  inherent 
capacity for fair play and ethical behavior. 
4.4  Reciprocity and the Gulden Rule  
  Role-taking  might  explain  the  natural  and  widely  documented  tendency  for 
reciprocity.  Reciprocity  means  that,  in  response  to  friendly  actions,  people  usually 
respond  nicely  and  favorably;  conversely,  in  response  to  hostile  actions,  they  are 
frequently nasty and even brutal. This is true even with strangers, even when it is costly to 
do so and yields no material reward (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Reciprocity implies that 
one is able to play the same role of the counterparty in order to treat him in the same 
manner he was treated. But this requires that one is able to envisage the role of the other 
party. The mirror neural system enables us to perform this process. 
  The Golden rule, “Do unto others what you want others do unto you,” is a near 
universal  ethical  rule  (Wattles,  1996).  It  can  be  seen  as  a  normative  extension  of 
reciprocity: Given that people will reciprocate the way you treat them, then it is better to 
treat them nicely so that they are likely to treat you nicely as well. “Tit for Tat” strategy 
is an obvious application: It starts with cooperation (being nice), which is the normative 
part; it reciprocates afterwards, which is the positive part. Not surprisingly, Tit for Tat is 
able to elicit cooperation very well (Axelrod, 1984). But the Golden Rule allows for a 
variety of other strategies, like Tit for 2 Tat and Generous Tit for Tat (Nowak, 2011). 
These  strategies  are  based  on  reciprocity  and  aim  at  eliciting  cooperation  rather  than 
defection, and that is the essence of the Golden Rule. 29 
 
  The logic of the Golden Rule is deeply ingrained in human judgments. When a 
bank sells a security to its clients, at the same time when the bank is betting against this 
security, it immediately becomes  obvious that the  bank is not behaving properly. The 
bank is not fair in treating its clients since it is recommending a security that it would not 
have accepted for itself, despite the fact that both the client and the bank have the same 
objective of making positive returns. Many governance issues, like conflict of interest and 
inside information, can be traced back, ultimately, to the logic of the Golden Rule.  
4.5  Symmetry 
  Symmetry is defined as immunity to a possible change. It had played a crucial role 
in the progress of science, and in recent times, it is considered as the foundation of science 
(Rosen, 2010). 
Stanford  University  professor  Roger  Shepard  (2001,  2008)  argues  that,  just  as 
symmetry  is  so  fundamental  to  universal  principles  of  science  and  physics,  like  the 
principle of least action, symmetry may be equally basic to universal principles of ethics. 
He argues that the “categorical imperative” of Kant (1785), and “the veil of ignorance” 
of Rawls (1971), and other moral theories, have as common the “symmetry of invariance 
under permutation of individuals” (2008, p. 28).  
  Shepard goes further to point out that a candidate for a universal moral principle is 
the Golden Rule, which is endorsed by most religions. Symmetry is deeply internalized in 
human beings, and thus serves as a basis for universal ethical principles. Just as all human 
beings have unique potential for learning a fully expressive natural language, all human 
beings have the latent potential for achieving rational, self-consistent, moral principles 
(ibid, p. 26). 
Robert  Nozick  (2001)  examines  the  nature  of  “the  objective  world”.  A 
phenomenon  is  objective  if  it  is  invariant  under  a  certain  range  of  possible 
transformations.  Nozick  extends  the  discussion  to  ethics,  examining  objectivity  of  the 
process for reaching ethical and moral judgments, and objectivity of ethical statements 
themselves.  For  the  process  to  be  objective,  one  has  to  be  impartial,  lack  personal 
involvement that might bias the result. The “ideal observer” of Adam Smith, and “veil of 30 
 
ignorance”  of  Rawls,  among  others,  reflect  this  requirement  (p.  288).  Objectivity  of 
ethical statements involves certain symmetry, and he cites the Golden Rule as an example 
(p. 289). He then cites several theories of justice, which require symmetry or similarity in 
treatment, like those of Kant, Sedgwick, and Hare. Nozick points out that “similarity in 
treatment stems from impartiality”. This means symmetry is required for both: process 
and judgment.  
Both Nozick and Shepard, therefore, make parallels between ethics and science, 
whereby symmetry is the common criterion for objectivity and consistency. 
4.6  Symmetry, Complexity, and Stability 
  Hermann Weyl (1983, p. 3) notes that, in one sense, “symmetry denotes that sort 
of concordance of several parts by which they integrate into a whole” (cited in Stewart 
and  Golubitsky,  1992,  p.  27).  When  parts  integrate  into  a  whole,  the  whole  would 
possess properties invariant under certain transformations, the parts fail independently to 
maintain.  For  example,  space-time  shows  invariant  properties  that  space  and  time, 
independently, do not preserve under transformation (Nozick, 2001, p. 77). 
  The fallacy of composition arises in complex systems in which invariances of the 
part or the individual are not identical to those of the whole or the group. This means 
that, when agents behave ethically, they are able to gain, as a group, invariances absent 
from individuals. By definition, invariance implies conserved properties under a range of 
possible transformations, and thus a minimum degree of stability of the system. The link 
between symmetry and stability therefore is not hard to see. 
  Putting the above discussions into perspective, it becomes clear that ethics are not 
purely  personal  or  subjective,  with  negligible  impact  on  markets.  Ethics  might  be  as 
objective as pure science, and are essential for stability and resilience of the economy.  
4.7  Ethics and Economics 
  According to Nozick (2001, pp. 240-242), the function of ethics is to coordinate 
on mutual benefits. But that is what we learn in elementary economics about “gains from 
trade.” Both ethics and trade, therefore, have the same function: to reach mutual gain. So 
how come they diverge and move apart? The answer lies in complexity: When the whole 31 
 
behaves differently from the parts, fallacy of composition arises, and thus self-interested 
trade would diverge from ethics. To bring them back, we don’t need to give up on trade. 
It is exactly the opposite: To preserve gains from trade we need to give up on zero-sum 
and  opportunistic  interactions.  These  interactions  defeat  the  objective  of  trade  that 
economists  analyze,  and  thus  become  ethically  questionable.  This  confirms  that 
economics, in essence, is a moral science. 
  Adam  Smith  was  right  about  the  market’s  invisible  hand.  He  only  failed  to 
mention  that  there  is  another  invisible  hand;  a  hand  that  coordinates  individual’s 
rationality with that of the group. Market’s hand works through material interest; the 
social hand works through the moral sense. The two hands are not supposed to miss with 
each other; rather, together, they can make a much more creative and interesting systems.  
5  Conclusions 
  We live in a complex world whereby properties and behavior of the whole diverge 
significantly from those of the parts. “Methodological individualism” cannot as such be 
taken for granted any more, particularly after the global financial crisis. Regulators and 
policy makers became well aware of this divergence, and accordingly, they are developing 
“macro-prudential” regulations in contrast to the previously adopted “micro-prudential” 
ones. But regulations, although necessary, are not sufficient. We need to re-examine the 
underlying  principles  guiding  economic  behavior.  Economics  and  finance  need  to  be 
redesigned  to  reflect  modern  developments  in  science  of  symmetry  and  complexity. 
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in this manner economics is able to reclaim its position 
as a moral science. 
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